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(1)  The evolution of the Swedish economy closely followed Schumpeter’s predictions until about 1980: Large
firms became increasingly predominant in production and innovative activity, ownership of firms became
more and more concentrated, individual entrepreneurship waned in importance, the general public grew
increasingly hostile towards capitalism, and by the late 1970s explicit proposals for a gradual transfer of
ownership of firms from private hands were launched.
(2)  Design of tax and industrial policies fueled a development of the economy along the lines predicted by
Schumpeter. In general, the policies discouraged private wealth accumulation. In particular, the policies
favored concentration of firms and concentration of private ownership.
(3)  The turning point away from the path to socialism coincides with real world developments that disclosed
two major flaws in Schumpeter´s analysis. First, the ever more obvious failure of socialism in Eastern
Europe went against Schumpeter’s assertion that socialism can work. Second, Schumpeter, who thought
that modern technology would make the giant corporation increasingly predominant, did not foresee the
revival of entrepreneurship that took place in the Western countries around 1980.
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In Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (CSD) Joseph Schumpeter raised the question whether
capitalism as an economic system would be able to survive. He concluded that socialism would
eventually displace capitalism also in Western democracies. Even if he thereby reached the same
conclusion as Marx, his arguments were quite different. It was not the shortcomings or the instability
of capitalism that produced the victory of socialism. Instead it was the superior performance of
capitalism that paved the way for socialism.
Today we live in an era where the achievements of capitalism are far more obvious than when
Schumpeter published his book in 1942. Yet, the introduction of socialism in the classical sense has
disappeared from the political agenda in democratic countries. This does not necessarily mean that
Schumpeter would have admitted that he was wrong in his prophecy. In his discussion of the time
perspective he emphasizes the secular perspective: “…in these things a century is a short time.” He
also makes clear that there is no pure economic reason why capitalism should not have another
successful round.
A further dimension is national diversity. Schumpeter underlined that different countries are unlikely
to follow the same route to socialism. Looking at today’s situation this observation does little to save
Schumpeter’s prophecy. For a long time, however, the development in the Swedish economy
followed a path similar to the one laid out in CSD. As we will show this could to some extent be
explained by economic policies that aimed at reinforcing the tendencies to follow the path that
Schumpeter had predicted for capitalist economies. A concrete plan (wage-earner funds), that had
the potential of transferring the ownership of the Swedish business sector to the labor unions, was
introduced. If the original plan had been implemented, Sweden would have been very close to
fulfilling all the parts in Schumpeter’s prophecy. However, in hindsight it is clear that this plan
marked a turning point in Swedish economic development. The plan was abandoned in the 1980s
and Sweden has since then, as most other Western countries, developed in a way that has been
contradictory to what Schumpeter predicted.
There is, however, a legacy from the old policies. The efforts to put the Swedish economy on a
Schumpeterian path has contributed some idiosyncratic structural features to the Swedish economy,
notably that Sweden ended up being dominated by large corporations to a larger extent than
perhaps any other OECD country and that private ownership became very concentrated. In
addition, private financial wealth became lower than in most industrialized countries. The combined
effect of these features has, as we shall see below, contributed to a rapid increase in foreign
ownership of the Swedish private sector, particularly following the internationalization of firms and
financial markets.2
The aim of this article is to investigate to what extent the Swedish economy followed the
Schumpeterian path and also to try to identify the factors that eventually set the Swedish economy
on another course. A conclusion of our analysis is that Schumpeter’s theory increases our
understanding of Swedish economic history after World War II. But the analysis is also of a more
general interest. Many of the Schumpeterian forces that were present in the Swedish economy were
present in most Western democracies up until the mid to late 1970s, even if the tendencies were
more pronounced in Sweden.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we briefly discuss the theory of evolution of
the capitalist economy that was presented in CSD. The analysis of Schumpeter does not lend itself
easily to simplifications. Still, we have extracted six stylized propositions that are essential elements
of his prediction about the fate of capitalism. These propositions will in subsequent sections be
confronted with data for the Swedish economy. The third section analyses the main ideas that were
shaping economic policy during the first decades after World War II in Sweden. In many respects,
the policies served to strengthen the tendencies in capitalist development that Schumpeter predicted
would eventually lead to the victory of socialism. In particular, the policies contributed to a greater
role for large corporations and to an increased concentration of firms and private ownership.
In the fourth section we examine the actual implementation of policies and discuss their relation to
the general ideas that were analyzed in section 3. In section 5 we confront the development in the
Swedish economy up until the beginning of the 1980s with the stylized propositions derived in
section 2. Section 6 contains an examination of the effort to replace private ownership by wage-
earner funds, and we try to identify the factors that eventually led to a reversal of policies. In section
7 we discuss the development of the Swedish economy after the abolition of wage-earner funds and
the subsequent reversal of policies. Section 8 concludes.
2. The Propositions in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy
Few economists have done more than Joseph Schumpeter did in The Theory of Economic
Development (1911, 1934) to increase our understanding of the role of the entrepreneur in the
capitalist economy. In particular, he asserted the crucial role of the entrepreneur in the process of
innovation and creative destruction – today it is virtually impossible to conceive of a dynamic
capitalist economy in the absence of the Schumpeterian entrepreneur.
However, in his late work Schumpeter (1942) saw the declining economic importance of the
entrepreneur as one of the major forces in the transformation from capitalism to socialism.
Schumpeter claimed that by means of modern techniques and modern modes of organization the
innovation process would become more and more automated. Innovations would no longer be3
connected with the efforts and the brilliance of a single person. They were increasingly to become
the fruits of the organized effort of large teams. This would be done most effectively within the
framework of large corporations.1
By using the proceeds from its monopoly power to finance new innovations, the large corporation
could improve its monopoly position and in practice crowd out entrepreneurs and smaller firms.
Schumpeter went as far as saying that the entrepreneurial function would become obsolete. Like
Marx, he therefore predicted that the economy to an increasing extent was going to be dominated
by large corporations. Unlike Marx, and for that matter Veblen (1923), Schumpeter did not foresee
any problems of economic stability or economic efficiency for the capitalist system. Instead,
capitalism would kill itself by undermining its political base by its own efficiency; the forces of
creative destruction would eventually kill capitalism itself.
The entrepreneurs were, according to Schumpeter, the backbone of the bourgeoisie, thus providing
capitalism with its institutional and political basis. By destroying the entrepreneurs through its
effectiveness, capitalism would also destroy its own political foundation. In an economy that is
increasingly dominated by giant corporations and devoid of entrepreneurs, the defense of capitalism
has no constituency. Instead, capitalism will have to confront increasing hostility. Here the
intellectuals were, according to Schumpeter, going to play an important role in formulating a criticism
against the capitalist system and its institutions. Eventually, a democratic and peaceful transformation
of the economy to socialism would take place.
While Schumpeter discussed the role of the intellectuals in the downfall of capitalism at great length,
he was very brief on the role of the labor movement in this phase. He refers to the labor movement
in connection with the discussion of the intellectuals, where he maintains that the intellectuals will
invade labor politics and contribute to a radicalization of the labor movement. He did, however,
come back to the labor movement more directly in later writings. There he wrote that labor would
dominate the political scene in the last stage of capitalism. For instance, he criticized Lenin for saying
that imperialism would be the last stage of capitalism. According to Schumpeter this was all wrong.
Instead he maintained that laborism is the last stage of capitalism. Laborism is characterized by
Schumpeter as that stage in capitalist society in which the labor interest is predominant (Swedberg,
1997, p. 119).
We have presented a very brief account of the scenario that Schumpeter (1942) envisaged for
capitalism in the chapter named “Crumbling Walls”. From Schumpeter’s scenario we extract the
following stylized propositions:
                                                
1 See Rosenberg (2000) for a thorough elaboration of this issue from today’s vantage point.4
1. The bulk of innovations will be made in large corporations.
2. Large corporations will be increasingly predominant in the economy.
3.  New and smaller firms will play a declining role in the economy.
4.  The concentration of ownership will grow over time.
5.  The general public, not least the intellectuals, will grow increasingly hostile towards capitalism
6.  Socialism will eventually replace capitalism.
The eventual defeat of capitalism was an unconditional forecast by Schumpeter. Technological
change, political development and even the intellectual debate were all endogenous parts of
Schumpeter’s scenario. There was therefore no room for a political effort to save capitalism. On the
other hand it was from the point of view of the socialist parties important to let events run their
course. Attempts to introduce socialism before the time was ripe could result in failure. (See
Schumpeter’s discussion on “transition” in CSD, pp. 227–229.)
In the rest of our article we will show that propositions 1–5 stand up well against the actual
development of the Swedish economy during the first four decades after WW II. As we will see,
Sweden also came close to fulfilling prediction 6.
It goes without saying that the process of private wealth creation plays a crucial role in the capitalist
system. This process was also at the center of Marx’s analysis of the rise and fall of capitalism. In
fact, Schumpeter is unclear on this point. Therefore it is not possible to extract a simple and clear-
cut proposition from CSD on this matter. When Schumpeter discussed the increasing concentration
of ownership he was referring to direct ownership. In his scenario households would own shares in
the big companies. This would not, however, in his view make people attached to the companies or
to the capitalist system. Even if Schumpeter did not express a clear and comprehensive view on the
role of private wealth formation, we will analyze the role of this factor in the development of the
Swedish economy. We will do so firstly because private wealth formation is an integral part of an
entrepreneurial society. Even in Schumpeter´s giant corporation scenario a high savings rate is
necessary. These savings have to be generated somewhere. In the Swedish case, government
policies towards savings played an important role in moving the Swedish economy along on the
Schumpeterian road towards socialism. This constitutes our second reason for analyzing the
development of savings and savings policies in this article.
3. The Ideas behind Economic Policy in Sweden after World War II2
                                                
2 Johansson and Magnusson (1998) provide a comprehensive account of the issues dealt with in this section. See also
Lindbeck (1997).5
For 44 years, from 1932 to 1976, the Social Democrats held the political power in Sweden.
Despite nine years of nonsocialist governments (1976–82 and 1991–94) it is fair to say that the
Social Democrats have dominated the political scene and the policy discussion since the early 1930s
until the present day. As a result, there is little doubt that its philosophy had a tremendous influence
on political decisions impinging on entrepreneurs, firms, private versus collective ownership and the
overall business climate. In view of this circumstance, we will focus on relaying the ideas advanced
by Social Democratic thinkers on the issues of interest here. It is apparent that the most important
Social Democratic thinkers have seen the large industrial corporation as the major unit of
production. Ernst Wigforss, Minister of Finance in 1925–26 and 1932–49 and probably the most
influential of all Social Democratic ideologues, is quite clear on this point. For instance, in his essay
on CSD (Wigforss, 1956) he seems to agree with Schumpeter on the inevitability of the movement
in capitalist societies towards progressively larger companies.
Among leading Social Democrats at the time, the well-read Wigforss was probably alone in his
good knowledge of Schumpeter´s work. A more influential theorist in the Social Democratic
movement was of course Karl Marx, whose wievs on the development of the capitalist society had
clear connections with Schumpeter’s. The Norwegian sociologist Gudmund Hernes (1991) has
emphasized the connection between Karl Marx’s theory of the development of industrial societies
and the Nordic Social Democratic Model. A key factor in Marx’s theory was the importance of
economies of scale, which would gradually lead to the phasing out of small firms as well as several
of the less competitive large firms.
Wigforss does not find Schumpeter’s and Marx’s prediction, that small and new firms are dwindling
in importance, disquieting. Instead he seems to argue that this trait of capitalist societies will facilitate
the collectivization or socialization of the productive capital stock, which is the ultimate goal of the
labor movement. Furthermore, Wigforss (1952, pp. 125–126) finds it essential to focus on the large
industrial corporation for non-economic reasons:
That is where the adversarial relationship between owners and employees is most fundamental, and where
the collective form of ownership and management can be most easily used as a means to achieve more
equality, freedom and solidarity (authors’ translation).
In the tradition of Wigforss, the Social Democratic economist Villy Bergström (1973) sketches a
strategy for a step-by-step transition from private to collective ownership of the means of
production. Bergström was also convinced that the pertinent unit to focus on is the large industrial
corporation: ”Throughout I consider the large industrial corporation as the incarnation of ‘the firm’”
(p. 8).3
                                                
3 In Swedish: ”Jag har hela tiden de stora industriföretagen framför mig som sinnebilden av ’företaget’”.6
Thus, the notion that large-scale production and a social order with strong collectivist elements were
conducive to economic development had considerable appeal at the time, and it was easy to find
inspiration from contemporaneous social scientists. In particular, John Kenneth Galbraith, who was
undoubtedly greatly inspired by Schumpeter (1942), was instrumental. Especially his book The
New Industrial State (1967) provided an important rationale for an economic policy oriented
towards the large corporation.4
Thus, by the late 1960s it was quite clear that the Social Democrats considered small firms and
individual entrepreneurs as marginal elements in the process of economic development, and in due
course such phenomena would be totally anachronistic. But what about the ownership and control
of these large production units?
Somewhat surprisingly, in Fackföreningsrörelsen och den fulla sysselsättningen (Trade Unions
and Full Employment), a major policy document from the Confederation of blue-collar workers
(LO) published in 1951 (in English as LO, 1953), it is difficult to find any bias favoring large
companies or institutionalized private ownership, although there is a clear inclination towards the
view that collective ownership and state ownership should gain in importance.
This inclination is in line with Wigforss’ stance on the ownership issue. He maintained that in the long
run the large industrial corporations had to be converted into ”social enterprises without owners”
(samhällsföretag utan ägare). In these enterprises individuals could still be shareholders, but the
shareholders were no longer residual claimants; wages should be set in wage negotiations, dividends
should be related to the level of interest rates in capital markets, and all excess profits should remain
within the companies.
For the trade unions and for Wigforss collective ownership of the means of production was the
ultimate political goal. In this perspective a strong concentration of ownership could be seen as a
natural and even desirable intermediate station on the road towards the ultimate goal. The strong
concentration of ownership alienated the Swedish constituency from capitalist values and could be
expected to contribute to a broad-based support for the industrial policies of the Social Democratic
party.
If a strong concentration of ownership is seen as undesirable from a political point of view, an
alternative to the policies actually pursued would have been a policy supporting a less concentrated
                                                
4 One indication of Galbraith’s great impact on Swedish policy makers is that shortly after the publication of The New
Industrial State he was invited by the then Prime Minister Tage Erlander to his official summer residence Harpsund to
give a two-day seminar on his book to the members of the government.7
and more broad-based individual ownership of the corporate sector. But such a policy would have
run counter to the long-term goals of the Social Democratic party. However it should have been a
very natural political course for the nonsocialist parties. Since they did not get into government until
1976 they never had the opportunity to pursue such a policy. Neither did they, during the 50s and
the 60s, manage to create a broad-based support among Swedish voters for such a policy.
As we shall see, the industrial policies actually pursued promoted a development of the economy
towards the visions of LO and Wigforss. In contrast, there were up until the middle of the 70s very
few attempts, by direct measures, to transfer ownership of corporations from private hands to the
government. However some steps were taken – especially in mining, steel and forestry – to increase
direct state ownership of the corporate sector. In 1970 the central government founded
Statsföretag AB, a large conglomerate to which most of the state-owned enterprises were
transferred. No doubt, many politicians saw this as an offsetting force to private owners. Still, state
ownership of the industrial sector was among the lowest in the OECD countries in the 1970s
(Lybeck, 1984).
This policy has been named ”the historical compromise” (Korpi, 1982). The industrial elite
acknowledged and accepted that the Social Democrats by virtue of their political strength would use
the political power to implement far-reaching welfare reforms, while the labor movement, on their
part, abstained from socializing the industrial sector. Among the ideologues in the social democratic
party this historical compromise was certainly seen as a temporary arrangement. The industrial
policy was working towards the goals set out by Wigforss and LO and within the labor movement
the debate on “the third step of socialism”, i.e., the abolition of private ownership to the means of
production, was alive.
4. Reinforcing Economic Policies
Schumpeter’s conclusions in CSD, summarized in our six propositions, primarily follow from his
analysis of the nature and functioning of capitalism, where inexorable internal forces are said to result
in the eventual demise of capitalism. A natural extension of Schumpeter’s analysis would be to
examine whether different economic policies would precipitate or decelerate this allegedly inevitable
development. In this section we will show how Swedish economic policies from the 1950s through
the 1970s were designed so that they directly encouraged the fulfillment of propositions 2–4. These
policies therefore paved the way for the realization of propositions 5 and 6, i.e., an increasing
hostility towards capitalism in the population and the eventual transition to socialism.8
4.1. Tax Policies
Several features of the pre-1990 Swedish tax system disfavored younger, smaller and less capital-
intensive firms, and discouraged entrepreneurship and family ownership in favor of institutional forms
of ownership. Several important distortions stemmed from high statutory rates of corporate income
taxation coupled with other policies that resulted in much lower effective tax rates. The statutory
corporate income tax rate remained in the very high range of 50–62 percent from the early 1950s
until 1990. Beginning in 1958, a large gap emerged between statutory and effective (average) tax
rates as a result of accelerated depreciation rules, the so-called investment fund system, inventory
valuation rules, and other ad hoc tax reductions. However, their usefulness as tax avoidance
mechanisms differed greatly across industries and types of firms. A clear and important example
was the liberal provisions for accelerated depreciation of machinery and equipment. These
provisions favored machine-intensive manufacturing industries over service-producing industries.
More generally, the depreciation rules disfavored firms and sectors that were intensive in human
capital, financial capital and intangible forms of capital. See Södersten (1984, 1993) and Davis and
Henrekson (1997) for further details.
High statutory tax rates favor a reliance on debt rather than internally generated funds or new share
issues to finance investments. However, the ability to exploit the tax advantages of debt financing
differed among industries and firms. In particular, to the extent that debt financing is less costly and
more readily available for larger, more established firms, high statutory tax rates coupled with tax-
deductible interest payments work to the disadvantage of smaller firms and potential entrants. Debt
financing is also more easily available to firms with ready forms of collateral. Hence, firms and
sectors that more intensively use physical capital reap greater benefits from tax code provisions that
favor debt financing. In practice, this aspect of the tax system favored the capital-intensive
manufacturing industries relative to other industries.5
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relative to that of other industry and commerce.9
Table 1 Effective Marginal Tax Rates for Different Combinations of Owners and  Sources of







Households 27.2 92.7 48.2
Tax exempt institutions –32.2 31.4 31.2
Insurance companies –21.7 41.6 34.0
1970
Households 51.3 122.1 57.1
Tax exempt institutions –64.8 15.9 32.7
Insurance companies –45.1 42.4 41.2
1980
Households 58.2 136.6 51.9
Tax exempt institutions –83.4 –11.6 11.2
Insurance companies –54.9 38.4 28.7
1985
Households 46.6 112.1 64.0
Tax exempt institutions –46.8 6.8 28.7
Insurance companies –26.5 32.2 36.3
1991
Households 31.7 61.8 54.2
Tax exempt institutions –9.4 4.0 18.7
Insurance companies 14.4 33.3 31.6
Note: All calculations are based on the actual asset composition in manufacturing. The following inflation rates were used:
1960: 3%, 1970: 7%, 1980: 9.4%, 1985: 5%, 1991: 5%. The calculations conform to the general framework developed by
King and Fullerton (1984). The average holding period is assumed to be 10 years. A negative tax rate implies that the rate of
return after tax is greater than before tax. For instance, a tax rate of –83 percent for a debt-financed investment owned by a
tax-exempt institution in 1980 tells us that a real rate of return of 10 percent before tax becomes 18.3 percent after tax.
Source: Calculations provided by Jan Södersten, see Södersten (1984, 1993).
To provide a sense of the magnitude of the distortions introduced by the Swedish tax system, Table
1 presents effective marginal tax rates for different combinations of owners and sources of finance
for selected years between 1960 and 1991. Three categories of owners and sources of finance are
identified, and the effective marginal tax rate is calculated assuming a pre-tax real rate of return of
10 percent. A negative number means that the real rate of return is greater after tax than before tax.
The table highlights four important aspects of the Swedish tax system during the postwar period
through the 1980s. First, debt financing consistently received the most favorable treatment and new
share issues the least. Second, retained earnings were consistently taxed at lower rates than newly
issued equity, which favored incumbent firms relative to entrants. Third, the taxation of households10
as owners was much higher than for other categories, and their rate of taxation increased during the
1960s and 1970s, whereas the reverse occurred for insurance companies and tax-exempt
institutions.6 From some point in the 1960s until the 1991 tax reform, more than 100 percent of the
real rate of return was taxed away for a household buying a newly issued share. Fourth, tax-exempt
institutions benefit from a large tax advantage relative to the other two categories of owners, and this
advantage increased strongly during the 1960s and 1970s.7
How do these distortions in the Swedish tax system compare to other countries? To partially
address this question, Table 2 reports corporate tax wedges for investments in machinery, buildings
and total business capital (an aggregate of machinery and buildings) in several OECD countries as of
1985. According to the table, the marginal tax wedges were invariably negative, which means that
after-tax rates of return exceed pre-tax rates of return. Among all listed countries, Sweden exhibited
the largest negative wedges and hence the largest corporate-tax bias towards capital-intensive firms
and industries.
                                                
6 Tax-exempt institutions by definition pay no tax on interest receipts, dividends or capital gains. This category includes
charities, scientific and cultural foundations, foundations for employee recreation set up by companies, pension funds for
supplementary occupational pension schemes, and the National Pension Fund (the AP Fund). In terms of industry
ownership and control, tax-exempt institutions have a dominant position in Sweden.
7 The calculations for households are based on an average household, but households owning a successful business typically
faced an even higher tax rate because of the combined effect of wealth and income taxation. Until 1992, wealth tax was levied
on 30 percent of the net worth of a family-owned company, incorporated or not. As of the mid-1980s, the maximum wealth
tax rate was 3 percent. Since the wealth tax was not deductible at the company level, funds required to pay the wealth tax
were first subject to the personal income tax and the mandatory payroll tax.11
Table 2 The Estimated Marginal Tax Wedge for Business Capital at a 5 Percent Real 
Interest Rate and the 1985 Inflation Rate (percentage points).
Machinery Buildings Total business
capital
U.S. Old –5.26 –2.41 –3.25
New –2.32 –0.68 –1.16
Japan –1,67 –0.81 –1.08
Germany –2.37 –2.40 –2.38
France –3.45 –3.29 –3.35
U.K. Old –5.55 –3.21 –4.58
New –3.03 –1.67 –2.46
Italy –3.85 –3.95 –3.91
Canada Old –3.61 –2.22 –2.77
New –1.53 –1.28 –1.38
Australia –7.98 –2.31 –4.78
Belgium –6.95 –4.39 –5.51
Netherlands –4.52 –2.17 –3.20
Spain –6.21 –4.64 –5.32
Sweden –9.11 –5.09 –7.05
Source: Fukao and Hanazaki (1987).
For a smaller set of countries, King and Fullerton (1984) report effective marginal tax rates by
ownership category, accounting for both corporate and personal income taxes. In that study
Sweden was the only country where more than 100 percent of the real return was taxed away in
1980 for households making corporate investments.8 Sweden also exhibited the most favorable
treatment of tax-exempt institutions. While strongly discouraging direct household ownership of
business, the Swedish tax system has generously subsidized investment in the housing stock. Fukao
and Hanazaki (1987) show that housing investment received preferential tax treatment in all
investigated countries, but more so in Sweden.
4.2. Credit Market and Savings Policies
As already mentioned briefly in section 2, an entrepreneurial economy is highly dependent on private
savings to retain its dynamism. However, Schumpeter (1942) – and, for that matter, Karl Marx –
foresaw a decline in the rate of return of savings as the most profitable investment opportunities
were gradually depleted. At the same time, a high aggregate savings and investment rate was an
                                                
8 This high figure comes about even though it may be presumed that, within each country, owners choose an asset
distribution that is reasonably optimal relative to the tax system they face.12
essential part of Swedish economic policy during the first decades of the postwar period
(Bergström, 1982). But achieving a high rate of aggregate savings without allowing strong economic
incentives to private individual wealth accumulation was not possible without a number of additional
measures such as large surpluses in the public sector and a highly regulated credit market. As we
will see, these policies can also be expected to reinforce the tendencies put forth by Schumpeter in
CSD.
Throughout the postwar period until the late 1980s, the Swedish credit market was highly regulated.
Inspired, among other things, by Gunnar Myrdal’s 1944 paper on ”high taxes and low interest
rates”, Swedish credit market policy was for a long time aimed at low interest rates for favored
sectors of the economy. The credit volume to the industrial sector was generally subjected to
quantitative restrictions and the rate of interest was also regulated, which resulted in a situation of
virtually continuous credit rationing. These developments continued until the early 1980s, when a
rapid process of deregulation began. The process was completed in 1989, when the remaining
foreign exchange controls were lifted. This set of regulations clearly favored credit access by larger,
older, firmly established firms and by real capital-intensive firms with ready sources of collateral.
See Jonung (1994) and Henrekson (1992).
The mandatory national pension system (ATP) instituted in 1960 transformed the public sector into
the most important supplier of credit. Large surpluses were accumulated in the national pension
funds, the so-called AP funds. In the early 1970s, the AP funds accounted for 35 percent of total
credit supply (Pontusson, 1992). The decision to accumulate savings to such a great extent in the
AP funds led to a massive further institutionalization of savings, which can be expected to have
benefited large, well-established firms with a good credit rating that could operate on a high debt-
equity ratio.9
The structure of the Swedish tax and pension system reduced incentives for individual wealth
accumulation in general and not only in the form of corporate equity. The availability of equity
financing is a critical factor for both start-ups and the expansion of incumbent firms. In general, the
riskier the business, the greater the reliance on equity relative to debt financing. The existence of
collateral notwithstanding, a sizable infusion of equity is often a prerequisite to obtain credits. In
addition, a large infusion of equity by the owners signals their belief that the project offers favorable
risk and return characteristics, which increases the willingness of banks and other outsiders to grant
credit.
The smaller and newer the firm, the more difficult for outside financiers to assess the viability and
profitability of the proposed investment project. Thus, ceteris paribus, small and newly established
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firms are more dependent on equity financing than large, well-established firms. Low private savings
exacerbates the inherent problem caused by asymmetric information. Also, given the level of wealth
or national savings, the composition of national savings is not neutral in its impact on
entrepreneurship and small business development. The manner in which savings are channeled to
various investment activities influences the type of business organization that can obtain credit.
Pension funds, for example, are less likely to channel funds to entrepreneurs than business angels or
venture capital firms. Hence, if the government forces individuals to carry out most of their savings
through a national pension fund system, small business credit availability can be expected to suffer
relative to an alternative policy that allow for greater choice by individuals regarding their savings
and investments.
A distinct point is that there is substantial scientific evidence supporting the idea that the individual
wealth position has important effects for the probability of becoming an entrepreneur and for the
propensity to expand. This has been interpreted as showing that entrepreneurs face liquidity
constraints (Evans and Leighton, 1989; Evans and Jovanovic, 1989). However, other
interpretations of the positive correlation between family assets and the propensity to become an
entrepreneur and/or expand an extant business are feasible. First, inherently acquisitive individuals
may both start businesses and forgo leisure to accumulate assets. Second, the positive correlation
may largely be due to the fact that the movement into self-employment arises because children tend
to inherit family firms. Recently, studies have been made where these potential biases are avoided.
Blanchflower and Oswald (1998) find that the likelihood of starting a business in Britain increases
significantly among those who receive an inheritance or a gift. Lindh and Ohlsson (1996) arrive at
the same conclusion for Sweden when studying people who receive a lottery gain.10 Holtz-Eakin,
Joulfaian and Rosen (1994) find that within the group of self-employed in the U.S. at the beginning
of the 1980s, the receipt of an inheritance had a statistically significant positive effect on both the
likelihood of remaining in business and on the expansion of the firm. In summary, strong empirical
evidence points to the importance of personal assets for the degree to which entrepreneurial talent is
exploited.
The evidence that individual wealth matters for the deployment of entrepreneurial talent lends
support to Knight’s (1921) view that risk bearing and ownership are inextricable aspects of
entrepreneurship. This is in contrast to Schumpeter (1911, 1934) who argued that the functions of
the entrepreneur and the risk-bearing capitalist could be separated. Our view, supported by the
evidence reviewed here, is that entrepreneurship, ownership and risk-bearing cannot be fully
separated. Hence, policies and institutions that channel assets away from individual control will
curtail the deployment of entrepreneurial talent and drive.
                                                
10 See also Van Praag and Van Ophem (1995).14
4.3. Conclusions
Thus, we may conclude from this section that from the 1950s until the 1980s a large number of
policy measures were implemented that had the effect of directly reinforcing the first four
Schumpeterian propositions. In particular, taxation of businesses became increasingly unfavorable
for individual owners and favorable for debt-financed investments. In combination with a policy of
highly regulated credit markets and low incentives for personal savings, one would expect these
policies to reinforce the first four Schumpeterian propositions. As a corollary, propositions 5 and 6
could be expected to come true in due course.
5.  The Propositions and the Swedish Economy
In this section we will explore to what extent the actual development in the Swedish economy after
WW II fits the propositions put forward in section 2. Starting with proposition 1, the question
where the innovations in Swedish industry were made, was studied in Granstrand and Alänge
(1995). From a unique data set containing the 100 major innovations in Swedish industry during the
postwar period, the authors conclude that more than 80 percent of those innovations took place in
large Swedish firms. Thus, proposition 1 seems to square with Swedish data. Whether the reason
for this is that the innovation process generally is routinized and automated is however not possible
to say. The result could simply be a reflection of the large share of big firms in the Swedish
economy, which in its turn could have other explanations than the routinization and automation of the
innovation process. The result shows, however, that the individual entrepreneur has not been an
essential ingredient in the Swedish innovation process.11 Lindholm Dahlstrand (1997) describes this
as a particular Swedish large-firm model of high tech innovation.
Let us now turn to propositions 2 and 3 that obviously are closely interconnected. During the
1980s, the self-employment rate in Sweden stabilized at a low level relative to Sweden’s historical
experience and relative to the contemporaneous situation in other countries. Since the early 1970s
until 1990, Sweden exhibited the lowest ratio of nonagricultural self-employment to civilian
employment among all OECD countries (OECD Employment Outlook, July, 1992). The
European Observatory for SMEs (1995) reports that Sweden had a lower self-employment rate in
                                                
11 Granstrand and Alänge (1995) also briefly discuss the general question whether Schumpeter´s proposition that socialism
will replace capitalism is right in the case of Sweden. By looking at the present situation they conclude that Schumpeter was
wrong. Our conclusion is different, mainly because we are looking at the development of the Swedish economy during the
whole period after WW II.15
1992 than any of the then 12 member countries of the European Community (EC). The Swedish
self-employment rate was found to be less than one-half the EC average.
The European Observatory for SMEs (1995) provides complementary evidence on the relatively
small role of small firms in Sweden. Among 16 European countries, Sweden shows the largest value
for mean enterprise size in 1990. Average enterprise size is 13 employees in Sweden, more than
twice the corresponding average value for the 16 European countries.
A number of measures comparing the predominance of large firms across countries are available. In
relation to the size of the economy, hardly any other country has as many large firms as Sweden.
Jagrén (1993) calculated how many firms on the Fortune 500 list (covering the world’s 500 largest
businesses) that come from each country and compared this figure with the GDP. His calculations
are reproduced in Table 3. Relative to GDP, Sweden proved to have twice as many Fortune-500
firms than Japan and the U.K., and four times as many as the U.S. and Germany. Even compared
to other countries dominated by large firms, such as Finland and South Korea, the number of large
firms relative to GDP was substantially greater.
Table 3 The Number of Fortune 500 Firms in Various Countries, 1991.
Country No. of Fortune 500 firms No. of firms per GDP unit
United States 157 0.028
Japan 119 0.050











Note: One GDP unit is defined as one billion USD (PPP adjusted).
Source: Jagrén (1993).
In Table 4 the average number of enterprises in different size classes in European countries is
calculated for the period 1988 to 1991. The average number is then used to calculate the size16
distribution of firms.12 On average, Sweden has the greatest number of large industrial firms per
capita among the countries compared. Here Sweden is followed closely by Germany, but then there
is a leap to Finland. In terms of medium-sized industrial firms per capita Sweden is about average,
while it ranks below average in the small size class. The impression that Sweden has many large but
comparatively few small firms compared to other European countries is strengthened when we
analyze the size distribution of firms. Sweden still ranks as number 1 in the large size class, and the
distance to the 2nd ranking country is greater. Sweden also has a large share of medium-sized firms
according to this definition. The share of small-sized industrial firms, however, is reported to be the
second smallest among the countries included in the comparison.
The interpretation of these cross-country comparisons of average firm size and size distribution of
firms is clouded by ambiguities in the economic concept of a firm, by differences among countries in
the legal definition of a firm, and by differences in measurement procedures. Despite these
interpretational difficulties, there seems little doubt that Sweden‘s reputation as a land of big
business was well founded in the late 1980s and early 1990s. If anything, the raw figures fail to fully
convey the extent of concentrated ownership and control in Sweden. In this regard, Fölster and
Peltzman (1997) note that the five largest final owners13 in 1985 held roughly 44 percent of the total
voting rights in companies with more than 500 employees, and the ten biggest had more than half. In
addition, these final owners held shares through intermediaries, which in turn were linked through
joint ownership. Fourteen such groups dominated the corporate sector, with three major ones alone
controlling companies that accounted for some two-thirds of employment, sales and total assets of
the 270 largest corporations in Sweden.
                                                
12 The number of countries included is governed by data availability. See Henrekson and Johansson (1999).
13 A final owner is an owner which is not in turn owned by another firm such as a subsidiary within a corporate group.
Typical final owners are pension funds, individuals and family foundations. Investment companies, on the other hand, are
not final owners, since they are controlled by their own shareholders.17
Table 4  The Average Number and the Size Distribution of Firms per Million Inhabitants in  the
Industrial Sector, 1988–91 (rank in parentheses).
Firms per million inhabitants Size distribution
Small Medium Large Small Medium Large Sum
Germany 1187 (3) 144 (2) 33 (2) 87.0 (7) 10.6 (6) 2.4 (6) 100
France 669 (10) 84 (9) 19 (10) 86.7 (8) 10.9 (5) 2.4 (6) 100
U.K. 650 (12) 75 (11) 22 (5) 87.1 (6) 10.0 (7) 2.9 (4) 100
Sweden 774 (8) 112 (5) 34 (1) 84.1 (11) 12.1 (2) 3.7 (1) 100
Italy 1365 (2) 77 (10) 11 (11) 93.9 (1) 5.3 (12) 0.8 (12) 100
Spain 1055 (5) 74 (12) 10 (12) 92.6 (2) 6.5 (11) 0.9 (11) 100
Belgium 678 (9) 91 (7) 21 (6) 85.8 (10) 11.6 (3) 2.6 (5) 100
Portugal 1504 (1) 161 (1) 21 (6) 89.2 (4) 9.5 (9) 1.3 (10) 100
Denmark 1131 (4) 124 (4) 21 (6) 88.7 (5) 9.7 (8) 1.6 (9) 100
Luxembourg 668 (11) 141 (3) 26 (4) 80.1 (12) 16.9 (1) 3.1 (2) 100
Finland 787 (7) 101 (6) 27 (3) 86.0 (9) 11.1 (4) 3.0 (3) 100
Norway 895 (6) 86 (8) 21 (6) 89.3 (3) 8.6 (10) 2.1 (8) 100
Average 947 106 22 87.5 10.2 2.2 100
Note: Small, medium and large firms are defined as firms with 10–99, 100–499 and 500+ employees, respectively. The
geographical coverage for Germany is the former Federal Republic of Germany.
Source: Henrekson and Johansson (1999).
Finally, while available data are fragmentary, there is some evidence to suggest that Sweden
experienced low rates of new firm formation until the mid to late 1980s. Braunerhjelm and Carlsson
(1993) calculate annual entry rates from 1920 to 1991 of new manufacturing firms with more than
one employee. Their series show that rates of new firm formation in the Swedish manufacturing
sector had became extremely low by the 1950s; it fell from approximately 4 to 2 percent from the
1920s to the 1950s. The annual entry rate fell further to 1.5 percent in the 1970s, and the average
entry rate was even lower in the 1980s.
To summarize, in comparisons among OECD countries, Sweden stands out as having a low rate of
self-employment, a dominant role for larger firms, and highly concentrated ownership and control of
private-sector enterprises. The available evidence also points to low entry rates of new Swedish
firms during a large part of the postwar period. This characterization of the employment structure of
the Swedish economy was most extreme in the mid 1980s.
As a background to proposition 4 we will give a brief account of the development of savings and
private wealth formation in Sweden after WW II. The development of Swedish net saving is
indicated in Table 5. Net national saving rose between the 1950s and the 1960s, and thereafter
declined sharply. For our purposes, the most noteworthy feature is the extremely important role of
the government sector for net saving in the 1960s and 70s. Close to two thirds of net saving took
place there, and a large part of these funds had to be channelled to the private sector. But, as long
as the government shunned ownership of industry this pattern of national saving presupposed lending18
on a massive scale to the private sector. In particular, saving in the social insurance system increased
from zero in 1959 to 4.7 percent of GDP in 1972. This saving took place within the mandatory
national pension scheme, the ATP-system, which was introduced in 1960. It accumulated large
surpluses for a long time in a buffer fund, although the system was in effect a pay-as-you-go system,
where entitlements had no relation to the rate of return on the assets in the fund. In the early 1970s
the AP fund system accounted for more than 35 percent of the total stock of credit outstanding
(Pontusson, 1992; Wickman, 1985).
Table 5 Net Saving as a Percentage of GDP, Annual Averages, 1950–96.
1950–59 1960–69 1970–79 1980–89 1990–96
Total 11.9 14.7 11.5 4.7 1.9
Household 4.5 3.6 1.8 0.5 3.1
Corporate 4.0 2.6 3.0 4.6 2.7
Consolidated
government
3.4 8.4 6.7 –0.4 –4.0
Source: Statistics Sweden, National Accounts.
When the AP fund was instituted it was decided that the fund should primarily invest in bonds. Since
most borrowers are too small to issue bonds, a number of so-called intermediary credit institutions
were formed. These institutions financed their lending through bond issues and granted credits to
housing, production firms and municipalities. As a consequence, a very small fraction of AP fund
lending has been directly to firms. For instance, in 1980 7 percent of total assets constituted direct
lending to firms. This lending was mainly so-called ”lending back” (återlån) based on the rule that
employers were allowed to borrow up to half the amount they had paid in to the fund during the
previous year. The potential for using this credit channel was therefore proportional to the wage bill
of the firm. This type of lending was abolished in 1987.
The weak incentives for private individual savings also resulted in low levels of saving for households
compared to other industrialized countries – see Table 6.
Table 6 Household Net Savings as a Share of Disposable Income in Sweden, OECD and 
OECD Europe, 1960–95 (%).
1960–69 1970–79 1980–89 1990–95
Sweden 6.1 4.0 1.1 5.6
OECD 9.7 12.1 11.2 9.8
OECD Europe 12.0 13.6 11.6 10.9
Source: OECD, Historical Statistics 1960–1980 and 1960–1995; OECD, Economic Outlook, Vol. 64, 1998.19
As a result of the consistently low household savings rates in Sweden for several decades, individual
financial wealth became very low by international comparisons. Such comparisons can only be
made for a limited number of countries. In Table 7 we report data presented by Pålsson (1998)
regarding financial wealth per capita in nine OECD countries in 1990 and 1995. Financial wealth
per capita in Germany, Canada, France and Italy is generally 3–4 times larger than in Sweden and
Japan. In the U.S. it is approximately six times larger than in Sweden.14












Source: Pålsson (1998), based on OECD, Financial Statistics (various years).
The low level of private wealth formation obviously tended to diminish the role of households as
owners in the corporate sector. We also saw in the previous section that the tax system favored
financing by debt and by retained earings relative to equity financing. The system was thus favoring
investments and accumulation of capital in the corporate sector at the same time as it was
unfavorable towards private wealth creation. The system also created an environment where the
stock market, because of extremely low valuations did not translate the capital accumulation in the
corporate sector into household wealth.
The replacement value of the capital stock in the corporate sector was generally much higher than
the stock market values of the firms. This is illustrated by Figure 1. It shows that Tobin´s q fell from
60 percent to 30 percent between 1970 and 1980. According to calculations in Södersten (1984)
Tobin´s q was approximatively unity in 1960. Another indication of the low market values are given
                                                
14 Lindh and Ohlsson (1998) find that a more unequal wealth distribution covaries positively with the share of self-
employed. The combination of low private savings and an extremely even distribution of these low savings implies that
fewer people either from themselves or from their associates, friends or relatives are able to raise the requisite equity to
realize their business projects.20
by the price earnings ratios for the large Swedish companies. The figure reports the P/E-ratios for
Ericsson, Electrolux and Atlas Copco, respectively. In the early 1970s, companies like these were
typically valued at P/E-ratios around 2–3.
As a result of the low level of private wealth creation and the strong disincentives towards private
ownership in the corporate sector, the share of private ownership in the corporate sector diminished
dramatically. This is illustrated in Figure 2.
Figure 1 Tobin’s q in 1970–80 in the Swedish Engineering Industry and the Evolution of the P/E-
Ratio in Three Swedish Engineering Firms in 1970–98.
Enclosed
Note: Tobin’s q is defined as the stock market value/calculated replacement cost for the 13 leading engineering corporations
in Sweden; the P/E-ratio is defined as the stock market value/profits before tax and extraordinary items. The evolution of the
the P/E-ratios have been fitted to a linear trend.
Source: Tobin’s q: Södersten (1984); P/E-ratio: Findata.
Let us now move to the concentration of private ownership and Schumpeter´s proposition 4. We
will start by examining the distribution of ownership in 1950. According to Spånt’s calculations the
households then held 75 percent of all Swedish listed stock. The calculations apply to final owners,
which implies that ownership by investment companies and other intermediate owners has been
netted out. The final owner categories are households, institutions and foreign owners. Private
ownership was highly concentrated at this point. This is clearly documented by Lindgren (1953) in a
study based on the 1945 Census. He shows that 6–7 percent of the stock owners controlled 65–70
percent of the stock market value. His findings regarding the ownership control in the large
companies (more than 500 employees) are of even greater interest in our context. In no less than 60
percent of the large firms one single individual represented the majority of the votes at the
shareholders’ general meeting. In more than 90 percent of the firms three owners or less constituted
the majority at the shareholders’ meeting.
Figure 2 The Distribution of Ownership of Swedish Quoted Stocks across Ownership
Categories, 1950–97.
Enclosed
Source: Spånt (1975), Norrman and McLure (1997) and Statistics Sweden.
The increasing share of ownership of institutions was paralleled by an increased concentration of
private ownership. Or to be more specific: The Wallenberg family gradually acquired an increasing
dominance on the boards of the largest Swedish firms during the postwar period. Glete (1994)21
studies the power structure of the largest firms in 1925, 1945, 1967 and 1990. In 1925 the
Wallenberg family controlled two of the 25 largest firms. By 1945 this had increased to five and by
1967 they controlled ten of the largest 25 firms. In 1990 the Wallenberg family controlled the board
of nine of the 25 largest firms.
In addition, frequently the same individuals or families held a majority position in a number of firms.
Against this background the then leader of the Communist party C. H. Hermansson coined the
expression “the fifteen families” in his 1962 book Monopol och storfinans (Monopoly and Big
Business). According to him these fifteen families controlled Swedish industry. This view of the
world was later confirmed by the government commission on ownership concentration
(Koncentrationsutredningen, SOU 1967:7) and by Glete (1987, 1994). According to
Shumpeter’s analysis in CSD Swedish industry had already at this stage come pretty close to the
point where the socialization of the industrial sector would become politically inevitable. As we have
discussed at some length, economic policies encouraged an increasing institutionalization of
corporate ownership, but it also spurred the development towards increased concentration of
ownership and firms.
At first sight it may appear paradoxical that a single family has been able to expand its power so
tangibly, while economic policies have been aimed at curtailing private ownership. In practice
however, the control of the firms has been based on a progressively smaller share of the equity base
of the firms. It appears that the Wallenberg family was far more capable of exploiting the ownership
void that opened as a result of the far-reaching institutionalization of corporate ownership during the
postwar period. Anyway, the upshot was an extreme concentration of private ownership in Swedish
industry, which is in accordance with proposition 4.
According to Schumpeter concentrated ownership breeds a hostility towards capitalism, while a
large number of entrepeneurs and a widespread ownership creates a political climate that is
favorable towards the capitalist system. We may now move on to the question whether the general
public in Sweden, as predicted by proposition 5, grew increasingly hostile towards capitalism.
In Table 8 we report the results from two questionnaires where a representative sample of
individuals have been asked about their attitudes towards entrepreneurship and business conditions.
In 1978 only 30 percent of the respondents believed that it was important to encourage
entrepreneurship and firm formation. In the 1980s people’s attitudes on this issue changed
dramatically and by the mid 1980s approximately four quarters thought this was important. Perhaps
even more striking is the fact that in 1978 only 37 percent of the respondents believed that business
leaders/entrepreneurs were most efficient in running a firm. In the 1990s this had also changed and
by 1997 the percentage who thought that business leaders/entrepreneurs were the most efficient
was so high that the question had virtually lost its relevance.22
Table 8 Results from Two Repeated Cross-Section Studies of Attitudes towards 
Entrepreneurship.
I. Question: Is it important to encourage entrepreneurship and firm formation? Share of respondents
believing that it is important:
Year 1963 1967 1978 1981 1985 1997
Share (%) 50 41 30 72 74 88
II. Question: Who do you think is capable of running a firm most efficiently? Choose between (1)
business leaders/entrepreneurs, (2) trade union representatives, and (3) do not know/equally good.
Share of respondents believing that business leaders/entrepreneurs were most efficient:
Year 1978 1982 1995 1997
Share (%) 37 55 80 90
Source: SIFO, Demoskop and The Federation of Swedish Employers, SAF.
Overall the Swedish corporate sector was at the end of the 1970s in a state quite close to the
visions formulated by the blue-collar trade union (LO) and Wigforss just after WW II. The
corporate sector was dominated by a small number of very large firms that were controlled by an
extremely small number of people and a very concentrated stock of wealth. According to
Schumpeter’s (1942) analysis the time should be ripe for a transition to socialism.
6.  Towards Socialism
In section 5 we have shown that the Swedish economy during the period 1945 to 1980 complied
rather closely with the first five Schumpeterian propositions presented in section 2. In this section we
will analyze to what extent the sixth and the most important proposition in CSD was fullfilled.
During the 1970s, the blue-collar workers’ trade union, LO, was very successful in inducing the
government to take a number of legislative measures aiming at giving labor direct influence on
corporate decision making. Prime examples are union representation on corporate boards of
directors, and the extension of collective bargaining through the Codetermination Act of 1976 (see
Pontusson, 1992).23
The underlying ideology was at least to some extent inspired by the Marxian theory of value, where
all surplus value is said to emanate from labor. Hence, labor is the factor of production that should
have the most saying in management decisions. Of course, these ideas are greatly removed from the
idea that the entrepreneur is of key importance in the economy since he or she ”specializes in taking
responsibility for and making judgmental decisions that affect the location, form and the use of
goods, resources, or institutions” (Hébert and Link, 1989, p. 47).
The radicalization of the labor movement during the 1970s also entailed explicit demands for
increased collective ownership. (In this process the intellectuals, in line with Schumpeter´s
proposition 5, played an important role.) Such demands had from time to time surfaced within the
labor movement even earlier on. Already in 1961 the LO Congress had before it a suggestion to
introduce so-called branch equalization funds, where high-profit firms should be forced to set aside
part of the pay increase from which they abstained as a result of solidarity bargaining.15 Such funds
were seen as a means of avoiding the consequences for the wealth distribution following from a
solidaristic wage policy (LO, 1961). A first important step towards increased collective ownership
was taken in 1974 when a fourth National Pension Fund (AP Fund) was introduced with the aim of
investing in the stock market. Until then the National Pension Funds had been totally banned from
equity investments.
Explicit demands for increased collective ownership on a much grander scale were voiced at the
1976 LO Congress where Rudolf Meidner and his collaborators presented a plan for an inexorable
transfer of ownership from private hands to collective ”wage-earner funds” (löntagarfonder) – see
LO (1976) and Meidner (1978). This can be interpreted as a concrete plan for materializing
Wigforss original vision to convert the large corporations to “social enterprises without owners”.
The wage-earner fund scheme entailed a gradual transfer of ownership of all firms with more than
50 (or possibly 100) employees to wage-earners as a collective group. The firms should be
obligated to issue new shares to the wage-earner funds corresponding to a value of 20 percent of
the profits. Thus, the transfer of ownership would be more rapid, the more profitable the firm.
Incidentally, assuming a rate of profit of 10 percent, it would take 35 years for the wage-earner
funds to obtain a majority equity share in the individual company. The wage-earner equity thus
acquired was intended to remain within the firm as working capital. The voting rights and other
ownership prerogatives were to be exercized by the local unions until the wage-earner shares
represented 20 percent of the total equity. At the point where the ownership share exceeded 20
percent the funds ownership rights would be transferred to more centralized bodies controlled by
                                                
15 According to Johansson and Magnusson (1998, pp. 115–116) the ultimate vision of the team writing this report was
“capitalism without capitalists”.24
the national unions but including representatives of other interests in society. It is interesting to note
that this form of socialization  was exactly in line with Schumpeter’s prediction of “laborism” as the
last stage of capitalism.
Since the shares were not supposed to be traded, labor’s influence over the allocation of
investments across firms was not intended to increase, at least not in theory. But it was quite clear
that the authors of the report saw the wage-earner funds as a means to give the labor unions the
power to make corporate investment decisions of strategic significance for the whole society. One
claim from LO was that wage-earner funds might prevent Swedish multinational firms from moving
employment and R&D abroad (LO, 1976, pp. 68–76, 87–88).
These explicit proposals to infringe on private ownership implied that the labor movement broke
away from the old historical compromise struck in the late 1930s. In due course therefore, the
wage-earner fund proposals met unprecedented opposition from capital owners. Leading Swedish
capital owners literally took to the streets. On October 4, 1983 capital owners rallied across the
country in defense of the right to retain ownership and control of their firms. Moreover, the original
Meidner proposal never gained full acceptance within the Social Democratic Party and subsequent
joint proposals from LO and the Social Democratic Party were less radical than the original
Meidner plan. Politically, any proposals were blocked from being carried out until the Social
Democrats returned to power in 1982. At this stage the public opinion had shifted against wage-
earner funds, but under pressure from LO the government introduced a considerably watered-down
version of wage-earner funds in 1984. The five wage-earner funds thus introduced were financed by
a 0.2 percent pay-roll tax and a 20 percent tax on real profits above SEK 1 million, which in
practice added approximately five percentage points to the formal tax rate (Agell, Englund and
Södersten, 1995). Most importantly, the build-up of the wage-earner funds was restricted to seven
years. The funds were abolished in 1992 by the then non-socialist government.
7.  The Turning-Point
We have in a somewhat stylized way described the development in and the policy towards the
corporate sector as a linear process where in the end socialism in one form or another would
replace capitalism. The wage-earners funds seem to fit perfectly into that model. However, the
introduction of the funds and their subsequent abolishment in fact became a turning-point for the
road towards socialism as we have described it.
In the 1980s Sweden followed the general trend of deregulation prevailing in the OECD economies
during this time. There were also a couple of large tax reforms that worked towards a more neutral25
treatment than before of different owners and different sources of finance. Tax progression was also
substantially lowered. A more detailed picture of these changes was given in section 4. A general
result of these changes was that the Swedish economy to a much larger extent than before became
integrated with the other capitalist OECD economies.
An important legacy of the old policies is that the abolitionof investment controls has led to a
dramatic increase in foreign ownership of the Swedish corporate sector during the last few years
(see Figure 2). To a certain extent this is a development experienced by all industrialized countries.
However, Sweden is involved in this process to a larger extent than most other countries.16 This
could to a large extent be explained by the structural features of the Swedish economy that we have
discussed in this article. Of special importance is the crucial role of the large corporations in
combination with the low level of private wealth in Sweden.
A very interesting question is what the forces were that broke the trend. The answer must
necessarily be speculative. During the seventies there were two important, but not necessarily
independent, changes in the environment that altered the prospects for a socialist policy. First,
during the 1970s there was a marked change in the international view of the market versus the
planned economy. During the first two decades of the postwar period both politicians and
economists harbored a strong belief in the possibility of planning the national economy. In this period
a growing role for the public sector in the economy was with few exceptions seen as an inexorable
trend. Many scholars such as the Nobel Laureate Jan Tinbergen (1968) predicted that there would
be a convergence between the economies in the West and the planned economies in Eastern
Europe. This would result from the combined effect of increased state planning in the West and
more flexible bureaucracies and a gradual easing of the political repression in the East. In this
process Sweden was often heralded as a role model among the Western countries. However,
during the latter half of the 1970s there was a renaissance for the free market economy in the
leading industrialized countries. Among other things, this was a result of the disappointing effects of
public interventions and planning in the West and the increasingly obvious failure of the planned
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economies of most other industrialized countries. See Jakobsson (1999, Table 4, p. 347).26
economies of Eastern Europe.17 In addition, the Swedish growth performance was distinctly worse
than that in most other industrialized countries (Lindbeck, 1997; Henrekson, 1996). This reduced
the confidence in the kind of interventionst policies that Sweden had pursued during the last couple
of decades.
Relating these developments to Schumpeter one must conclude that he did underestimate the
efficiency problems in socialist systems. The experiences in Eastern Europe also underlined the
impossibility of combining full-fledged socialism with democracy. To summarize: Schumpeter’s
assertion that socialism of course can work, had been refuted by real world developments, and this
assertion was one of the building blocs in his scenario.
Second, towards the end of the 1970s the previous trend of a growing predominance of giant
corporations and the waning importance of small (entrepreneurial) firms was broken (Loveman and
Sengenberger, 1991). The average firm and establishment size began to decrease and the individual
entrepreneur once again came to play an important role in economic development.18
There are several explanations to this development. To begin with, technical change no longer seems
to give rise to economies of scale in production the way it used to. On numerous occasions, small
scale, flexibility and customer proximity may lead to superior performance in smaller production
units (Audretsch and Thurik, 2000). Moreover, the comprehensive changes in technologies and
market conditions give rise to new business opportunities that can often be most suitably exploited
within newly formed business organizations (Baldwin and Johnson, 1999; Acs and Audretsch,
1990). Finally, it is likely that the deregulatory process that was initiated at the end of the 1970s in
the leading countries undermined the monopoly position of many of the large corporations at the
time, which created new business opportunities for small firms and new entrants.19 Ronald Reagan
epitomized the situation in the early 1980s as follows: ”We have lived through the age of Big
Industry and the age of the giant corporation. But I believe that this is the age of the entrepreneur”.
20 To the extent that this presumption was true, the structural basis of Schumpeter’s theory and
Wigforss’ vision was gone.
                                                
17 See Yergin and Stanislaw (1998) for a comprehensive but easily accessible presentation of this development.
18 Blau (1987) documents that in the early 1970s the secular downward trend in the self-employment rate was reversed and
it has been rising ever since. The strongest factor behind this development is that total factor productivity began to grow
faster in industries amenable to self-employment relative to other industries.
19 For an overview of studies providing corroborating evidence on these points, see the recent surveys in Wennekers and
Thurik (1999) and Carlsson (1999).
20 Quoted from Brown, Hamilton and Medoff (1990, p. 1).27
8. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have shown that key economic policies in Sweden precipitated the gradual
fulfillment of Schumpeter’s visions in CSD. In particular, it is worth emphasizing that the increasing
hostility towards capitalism foreseen by Schumpeter also materialized. As a result, the way was
paved for proposals entailing a democratic and peaceful transition to socialism. However, these
proposals were eventually abolished and Sweden turned away from socialism. This turning point
highlights a couple of flaws in Schumpeter’s scenario. First, real world developments refuted his
assertion that socialism could work as efficiently as capitalism and that it could readily be combined
with democracy. Second, he did not foresee that technological change once again would pave the
way for the individual entrepreneur in the capitalist economies.
The global renaissance for small business and independent entrepreneurship has probably
contributed to the increased popularity of capitalism. Therefore it seems as though Schumpeter was
right in his key assumption that the entrepreneur is the political backbone of capitalism.
Finally, structural and technological conditions may once more change in such a way that small
businesses and individual entrepreneurs wane in importance. Such a scenario cannot be ruled out.
There are at least some indications that large scale is gaining in importance: the current wave of
mergers and acquisitions among large multinationals, economic globalization resulting in strong scale
economies in distribution and marketing, at least in the pharmaceutical industry we see important
scale economies in product development, and empirical evidence showing that optimal firm size is
growing in the service sector is rapidly accumulating (Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh, 1996). Should
these tendencies prove to be a new trend, we could again experience the growing hostility towards
capitalism that Schumpeter foresaw in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. It is however
difficult to believe that socialism would come back as a credible alternative.28
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